Towards a European Company Law by Carreau, Dominique & Lee, William L.




Towards a European Company Law
Dominique Carreau
William L. Lee
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, and the International Trade Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Dominique Carreau, William L. Lee, Towards a European Company Law, 9 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 501 (1988-1989)




The prospect of creating a genuine "European" company law was
raised as early as 1959, just two years after the signing of the Treaty of
Rome establishing the European Economic Community.' Curiously, the
initiative was taken by practitioners and scholars and not by the business
community, which expressed little interest in such an innovation at that
time. The first steps were taken by the French Notaries Public who, at
their 57th Annual Congress, suggested that it might be desirable "to
adopt, by means of an international convention, a comprehensive com-
pany law, probably restricted to socidtds anonymes (large, publicly held
[French] corporations) as done previously in the field of international
transportation."2 This suggestion almost immediately received the sup-
port of the Commission, which invited academics and professional orga-
nizations to comment on such an idea.' A series of symposia and articles
resulted from the proposal, but no further progress was made at that
time.
4
The movement to produce a uniform European corporate law
gained momentum when France, on March 15, 1965, transmitted to the
other Member States an official memorandum suggesting that a detailed
* Chairman, Department of European and International Corporation Law, University of Paris
I, Panthion Sorbonne; Consultant to Shearman & Sterling, Paris.
** Partner, Shearman & Sterling, Paris.
1 Treaty Establishing a European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 26
[hereinafter EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome].
2 See Thibierge, Le statut des socidtis dtrangres, in Le Statut de l'etranger dans le marchd com-
mun 360 (Paris 1959), quoted in 2 H. SMrr & P. HERzoG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNriy § 54.06 (1988).
3 See H. SMrr & P. HEazoG, supra note 2, at § 54.06.
4 Id.
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study be undertaken by experts working closely with the Commission.5
As a result, in 1966 the Commission sent a memorandum ("1966 Memo-
randum")6 to the Council surveying the need for such a new legal enter-
prise. The Commission also appointed a panel of national experts headed
by Professor Sanders of the Netherlands with a view to drafting "Euro-
pean" company legislation. As the drafting process progressed, however,
differences of opinion arose as to certain proposals, such as the liberaliza-
tion of the use of bearer shares7 and, more importantly, increased worker
participation in corporate governance."
Consequently, and in view of the reluctance of the Council to ad-
dress the problems involved in creating the new legal form, the Commis-
sion decided to take over the responsibility for drafting the proposed
legislation. In June 1970, it produced a massive draft regulation com-
prising 284 articles and four annexes.9 The proposed regulation was sub-
mitted to the Economic and Social Committee of the Community, which
rendered a favorable advisory opinion in 1972.10 The draft was then sub-
mitted to the European Assembly (the predecessor of the present Euro-
pean Parliament), which, in July 1974, adopted the Commission's
proposals after submitting certain amendments primarily in the contro-
versial area of worker participation. The Commission incorporated the
European Assembly's suggestions in the final version of its proposal,
which was transmitted to the Council on June 30, 1975 ("1975 Draft").'
2
To facilitate its technical examination, the Council appointed an ad
hoc working party in 1976 which proceeded with a first reading of the
proposal between 1976 and 1982.13 The working party made steady pro-
gress, but then suspended discussions in 1982, when the first reading was
made dependent on reviewing the Commission's proposals to harmonize
the Member States' legislation on groups of companies.14 At this point,
5 For the French text of this memorandum, see Revue des Sociit& 79 (1967). See also Foyer,
La Proposition Franqaise de Criation d'une Socidtd de Type Europien, 8 R.M.C. 268 (1965), cited in
H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.07.
6 BULL. EUR. COMM., supp. 9/10 (1966); see H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.07.
7 The governments of certain Member States objected to the use of bearer shares, which provide
opportunities for tax avoidance not available with registered shares.
8 See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
9 See H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.07 and § 54.12.
10 See Statute for the European Company: Commission Memorandum to Parliament, the Council
and the Two Sides of Industry, in BULL. EUR. COMM., supp. 3/88, at 20 (1988)[hereinafter 1988
Memorandum], citing 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 19-24 (1972).
11 See 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 20, citing 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 93) 4 (1974).
12 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 20-21.
13 Id., at 21.




all negotiations within the Council ceased 5, and it was widely believed
that the proposal to create a truly unified "European" company law had
been buried for all time.
Nevertheless, the movement to create a European company law was
revived during the recent drive to "complet[e] the internal market"' 6 by
December 31, 1992. This was ignited by the Commission's famous
White Paper of June 1985 ("White Paper") and was formalized by the
adoption of the Single European Act in 1986.1" In its White Paper, the
Commission asserted the necessity of creating "a legal framework that
would facilitate cooperation between enterprises." 18 Noting that "the
creation of an optional legal form at [the] Community level holds consid-
erable attraction as an instrument for the industrial cooperation needed
in a Unified Internal Market,"' 9 the Commission pronounced that "[a]
decision on the proposed [European company] statute will clearly be
needed by 1992."2o Against this background, on June 8, 1988, the Com-
mission adopted a memorandum proposing a European Company Stat-
ute ("1988 Memorandum"). 2' The memorandum was submitted to the
Parliament, the Council, and "the two sides of industry" (the employers
and the labor unions), which had six months (until December 1988) to
offer their views.22 The Commission would now proceed with presenting
its legislative proposals, which will presumably be available by late 1989.
II. THE Two POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO PROMOTING EUROPEAN
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
The Commission has sought to promote industrial cooperation in
the Community through a two-pronged company law program: (1) the
harmonization of the corporate laws of the Member States and (2) the
creation of a truly "European" corporate entity.23
A. The "Communitization" of National Company Laws
Article 54(3)(g) empowers the Council, through the adoption of ap-
propriate directives, to "coordinat[e] to the necessary extent the safe-
15 Id.
16 Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(85)310 final, (June 14, 1985)[hereinafter White Paper].
17 Single European Act, 30 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 17 (1987).
18 White Paper, supra note 16, at 35.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10.
22 Id. at 6.
23 Id. at 18.
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guards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others,
are required by Member States of companies or firms... with a view to
making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."24 Pur-
suant to this authority, seven "coordination" directives have been
adopted and five additional directives have been proposed. Therefore,
the Council could create a European company law through the adoption
of directives of coordination to render virtually identical the safeguards
offered by various national company laws. This approach would have
the added benefit of minimizing problems which occur due to discrepan-
cies between the applicable domestic legislations. However, considerable
difficulties have been encountered in the past in formulating and adopt-
ing directives to harmonize company law. This traditional coordination
approach does not appear promising, notwithstanding the benefits of har-
monization. The Commission itself was forced to recognize that the har-
monization approach "seem(ed) to be losing momentum" 5 and that
"coordination, even if pursued to the maximum extent, will not bring
about complete unity of the national condition under which enterprises
are allowed to undertake their business."26 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion elected to carry out its company law program by means of establish-
ing the legal framework for a corporation at the Community level.27
24 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at 39, art. 54(3)(g). In addition, Article 220 authorizes Member
States, independent of Commission action, to enter into formal international agreements with respect
to specific issues of corporate law (mutual recognition, retention of legal personality in the event of
cross-border transfers of headquarters, or mergers of firms subject to different jurisdictions). Id. at
89, art. 220.
25 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 12.
26 Id. at 18.
27 Id. The concept of an international corporation was not new. See H. SMrr & P. HERZOG,
supra note 2, at §§ 54.03-04. In the years immediately following World War II, in order to facilitate
reconstruction and to operate public services common to several European states, the Council of
Europe proposed the creation of new international corporate forms. Id. at § 54.03. Although the
proposals of the Council of Europe did not succeed, several European legal entities were subse-
quently created in the 1950's through international conventions, such as EUROFIMA and SAAR-
LOR in 1956, and EUROCHEMIC in 1957. Id. at §§ 54.03-04. The approach was cumbersome,
however, as it required entering into an international treaty each time the need arose for a new legal
entity, and drafting bylaws to regulate it.
Creation of an international corporation in the absence of a treaty specific to such purpose is
possible under the terms of the Treaty Establishing a European Atomic Energy Community, March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM Treaty], which envisions the possibility of es-
tablishing "joint undertakings" for "the development of the nuclear industry in the Community."
See EURATOM Treaty, id. at 187-88, arts. 45-51; see also H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at
§ 54.05. However, such "joint undertakings" are limited to projects of "fundamental importance,"
and are not intended as normal legal forms for the nuclear industry as a whole. See Euratom Treaty,
id. at 187, art. 45. Indeed, very few "joint undertakings" of this type have been created pursuant to
the Euratom Treaty. No similar express provisions exist in the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community for the creation of "joint undertakings".
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B. Truly "European" Companies
Although the Treaty of Rome does not contain any provisions ex-
pressly authorizing the creation of a "Community incorporated corpora-
tion," sufficient enabling authority may be found in Article 235, which
expressly validates the doctrine of implicit powers of the Community.
28
Article 235 has been invoked by the Council in the past, including, on
one occasion, in the company law area, when a new corporate structure,
the European Economic Interest Grouping ("EEIG"), was created in
1985.29 As the Commission correctly observed, "this [was] the first time
that Community firms [had] been provided with an instrument of cooper-
ation based on Community law."30 However, in spite of hopes that the
EEIG would further the industrial cooperation of European firms, the
functions assigned to the EEIG were limited. The EEIG may not hire
more than 500 employees, may not borrow on the financial markets, and
may not act as a holding company or be used as a vehicle for carrying out
cross-border corporate mergers.
3 2
Unlike the EEIG, which was limited to undertaking specific corpo-
rate functions, the Commission's revived proposal for a European com-
pany law seeks to establish a single legal vehicle with full corporate
powers. This legal vehicle could be used by companies operating EEC-
wide, obviating the need to incorporate in every jurisdiction. As stated
by the Commission, "A European Market calls for a European
Company."
33
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE
The arguments in favor of the creation of a truly "European" com-
pany law were highlighted by the Commission in the 1966 Memorandum
"concerning the setting up of a European company law."' 34 The first ob-
jective was - and still remains - to offer European corporations a new
legal structure facilitating their cross-border activities. The economic
unity of the Community requires the unity of its corporate legal organi-
zation. Corporations should be able to have the same legal personality
throughout the territory of the EEC, to transfer their headquarters be-
tween Member States without being forced to liquidate the company in
28 Id.
29 Id. The EEIG will be effective as of July 1, 1989.
30 19th Council Report of the Commission, § 243 (1985).
31 COUNCIL REGULATION 2137/85, 28 O.J. EUR.COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985).
32 Id.
33 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 5.
34 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.07.
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the country of origin, and to set up local branches in every Member State
at reasonable cost and with minimum obstacles.35 The second objective
is to allow European corporations to adjust their legal structures more
easily to the needs of the changing economic environment and to remain
competitive in a global market. Faced with inadequate legal means for
cross-border cooperation, European firms feel that they are at a competi-
tive disadvantage compared to their United States and Japanese rivals
because they are unable to achieve economies of scale efficiently or to
mobilize sufficient human and financial resources within their home
market.36
Indeed, the presence of largely different domestic company laws has
continually acted as the most significant obstacle to greater cooperation
among European corporations. Although companies have been able to
collaborate across frontiers through joint ventures and cross-sharehold-
ings, 37 formal mergers have been impossible because of the legal and tax
obstacles involved. 38 A cross-border merger entails a loss of legal person-
ality and a change of nationality by the acquired company and, thus,
requires unanimous shareholder consent. 39 The current taxation of capi-
tal gains following the acquisition of the non-surviving corporation also
serves as a significant tax obstacle.4 These barriers have essentially pre-
cluded cross-border mergers, and corporations have been forced to resort
to less appealing forms of economic cooperation, such as holding compa-
nies or joint ventures.
Thus, as a practical consequence, multinational corporations with
European-wide activities seeking to operate through subsidiaries must
comply with the local incorporation laws of each Member State in which
they wish to do business. In so doing, they have incurred significant fi-
nancial and administrative costs. Moreover, the centralized management
of such a group of corporations has proven extremely difficult. For
although such companies have a common economic goal, they are gov-
erned by a plurality of often conflicting national company laws which, in
most countries, ignore the legal requirements of corporate groups.
Different and sometimes conflicting tax laws and regulations also act
as a deterrent to the formation of European conglomerates. A European
35 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.08.
36 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 5.
37 Foreign direct investment may also be subject to disclosure, notification, approval or other
requirements under the laws of the Member States. However, such laws seldom act as a complete
barrier to completion of a transaction.
38 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 10.
39 Id. at 12.
40 Id. at 10.
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company law could eliminate the current double taxation of dividends
distributed by a subsidiary to a parent company located in another Mem-
ber State (in particular in the form of withholding taxes).41 It could also
eliminate the economic double taxation that can result from the upward
adjustments made to the profits of the company located in one Member
State without corresponding adjustments being made by the second
Member State to the profits of the company incorporated under its juris-
diction.42 Finally, differing systems and rules for determining taxable
profits unduly influence decisions as to the most appropriate jurisdiction
for establishing an EEC presence, which places certain Member States at
a competitive disadvantage.43
The unified market horizon of 1992 clearly makes more compelling
these arguments for a true "European" company law. Cross-border co-
operation will develop even further and many European corporations
will be forced to undertake massive restructuring operations. But, as the
Commission has aptly noted, "the statute... will limit the overly fre-
quent and at times contested use of takeover bids"' while remarking on
the "widening rift between the obvious economic need to restructure
companies and the poor legal means available for [such] purpose".45 It is
against this background that the Commission decided to reactivate the
"Statute for the European Company" on June 8, 1988.46
IV. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE 1988 COMMISSION
PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW
The proposals put forward by the Commission on June 8, 1988, did
not take the form of an amended version of its lengthy 1975 draft.
Rather, the Commission published a less ambitious work consisting of a
presentation of new guidelines for a European Company Law and sought
comments from interested parties which would be considered in prepar-
ing a final proposal.47 The European Company Law has a dual aim: (1)
to stimulate industrial cooperation by facilitating cross-border link-ups
and mergers and (2) to promote "social progress" by involving workers
in management. While attempting to accommodate both camps, the
Commission focused on five specific issues that had proven critical in the




4 4 Agence Europe, No. 4799, 5 June 1988, at 5.
45 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 8.
46 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
47 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 17.
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of the statute: (1) coexistence with national systems of company law; (2)
worker participation in corporate governance; (3) information and con-
sultation rights of workers; (4) rules applicable to groups of affiliated
companies; and (5) taxation.48
The future European Company Statute will create a single corporate
status entirely anchored in the Community legal order and thus will be
totally separate from existing national systems. As a result, twelve na-
tional corporate regimes will coexist alongside the new unified Commu-
nity-based company law. Although the Community statute may contain
provisions that are unknown in, or different from, those existing in na-
tional company laws, the importance of such differences should not be
overestimated for at least two reasons. First, attempts to harmonize na-
tional corporate legislation by means of Community Directives will con-
tinue and may diminish the risk of basic conflicts on crucial points.
Second, incorporation under the Community statute will remain optional
and companies will retain the alternative of selecting their own national
laws.49 However, a key question to be addressed is the degree of freedom
of choice granted to companies under the proposed statute. The 1988
Memorandum suggests that all companies will be free to incorporate
under the proposed statute.5 ° However, the availability of the European
Company Statute as finally adopted could possibly be limited to and de-
pend on the purpose of the entity to be incorporated and the legal status
of its founders or the size of their assets."1
As indicated above, some form of worker participation in the struc-
ture and decisionmaking process of the European company has always
been present in the previous drafts of the European Company Statute.
But despite widespread support for the idea, the bitter and protracted
controversies surrounding its implementation have caused this issue to
become the principal stumbling block in the adoption process. 52 The
Commission has decided in favor of the flexible approach already con-
tained in the proposed fifth company law directive, which permits the
company to choose among three alternative formulas for worker
participation.53
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id. Such a framework is currently present in many federations where corporations may either
incorporate and operate under the Federation system, or may incorporate under the laws of any of
the constituent states.
50 Id. at 17.
51 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The drafts were produced under the direction of
Professor Sanders.
52 See supra Note 8 and accompanying text.
53 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 14.
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Under the first and most restrictive scheme, patterned on the Ger-
man system of co-management, workers elect between one-third and one-
half of the company's supervisory board. Under the second scheme,
modelled on the Franco-Italian system, workers are represented by a
committee separate from the company's managing bodies, which is enti-
tled to be kept informed of ongoing business decisions by management.
Under the third scheme, inspired by the Swedish system, the degree of
worker participation in each company's management is determined
through collective bargaining. 4 The 1988 Memorandum suggests that
Member States could be entitled to restrict such choice to prevent the use
of the European Company Statute to circumvent the constraints of a
stricter national legislation.55 Thus, for example, European companies
organized on German territory could be forced to apply the unique Ger-
man participatory system. 6 Moreover, future European companies will
be obligated to grant their employees the information and consultation
rights which are required under existing Community Directives. 7 Also,
any subsequent Community Directives designed to improve social rela-
tions will be applicable to all companies operating in the Community,
either under a European or a national incorporation.5"
The strategic desirability of including in the European Company
Statute specific rules applicable, not only to formal cross-border mergers,
but also to structured cooperation among groups of companies remains
an open question. 9 Only the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany
and Portugal contain provisions on relations between affiliated compa-
nies going beyond the principle of each company's economic indepen-
dence - such as provisions protecting minority shareholders where the
controlling company owns less than 100% of the shares of an affiliate.60
The 1975 Draft included provisions, inspired from the German model,
permitting those setting up a holding company or joint venture structure
to elect a special group status aimed at facilitating the management of
such groups as a single economic unit, while also protecting the legiti-
mate interests of third parties such as minority shareholders or credi-
54 Id.
55 Id. at 14-15.
56 Id. at 15.
57 Id. at 15, citing Council Directive of17 February 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975);
Council Directive of 14 February 1977 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relat-
ing to the Safeguarding of Employees'Rights in the Event of Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or
Parts of Businesses, 20 OJ. EUR.COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977).
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tors. 6' However, the buy-out and exchange rights granted to minority
shareholders under the 1975 Draft proved to be one of the major points
of contention that led to the suspension of Council negotiations in
1982.62
Finally, the Commission memorandum proposes a simple and at-
tractive tax regime under which a European company will be taxed in the
state where it is domiciled. This proposed tax will be calculated on an
aggregate basis after adjustment for the profits and losses of its perma-
nent establishments located in other Member States. 63 Accordingly, tax
losses of a Greek subsidiary, for example, would be applied to the income
of its British parent company on a consolidated basis. In other words, a
European company will be taxed on the consolidated results of its eco-
nomic units established within the Community.
V. THE FIRST REACTIONS
Up to this point, the European Company Statute proposal has been
greeted unofficially with limited enthusiasm, if not outright opposition,
by Member States, employers and trade unions."4 In the past, the major-
ity of comments focused on the worker participation concept and its pro-
posed implementation. The primary opposition came from the
employers' European association (UNICE), the only interested party to
adopt an official position on the Commission memorandum last Novem-
ber.65 UNICE had bitterly opposed the Commission's proposed directive
of 1980 (the so-called "Vredeling" Directive). The directive would have
required pan-European companies to provide information to their em-
ployees concerning, among other things, their financial situation and
strategies, and to consult with such employees before taking any action
likely to affect them significantly.66 UNICE has reserved final judgment
on the European Company Statute until the employee participation op-
tions are fully developed by the Commission. However, UNICE mem-
bers from Member States where mandatory provisions on employee
participation do not exist have suggested that employee participation be
61 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at § 54.14(b).
62 Id.
63 1988 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16.
64 See Dawkins, Britain Leads Opposition to European Company Statute, Financial Times, Oct.
17, 1988, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter Britain Leads Opposition]; .4 European Company Plan, Bus. L.
BRIEF, (Oct. 1988), at 6.
65 EUROPE, NO. 4903 (NEW SERIES), AT 11, (Nov. 30, 1988).
66 Proposed Council Directive of 24 October 1980, 23 O.J. EUR: COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980),
amended by Proposed Council Directive of July 13, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983).




determined by the law of the situs of incorporation of the company.
67
Although Member States have up to now officially abstained from
commenting on the 1988 Memorandum, it is well known that the Com-
mission and the British Government are on a collision course.68 The
Commission has frequently focused recently on the "social dimension" of
the 1992 internal market and made references to a "social Europe".
Conversely, the British Prime Minister has unequivocally warned against
"social engineering" and undue interference with free market forces. 9
More generally, doubts have been expressed as to the usefulness of a
European Company Statute. UNICE, for instance, has described the Eu-
ropean Company Statute as a "useful legal instrument" but not one that
is indispensable to the realization of the Internal Market.7° While the
Statute might prove useful to small- and medium-sized companies desir-
ing to establish branches or subsidiaries in several Member States,
UNICE feels that with respect to larger companies, it would have been
more important to have passed the proposed 10th Directive on cross-
border mergers facilitating certain types of restructurings. 71 This opin-
ion is shared unofficially by the British Government, which has consist-
ently expressed its skepticism as to the advisability of the creation of an
autonomous European Company Statute.72
The debate over the European Company Statute is only one aspect
of the broader controversy surrounding the nature of the economic and
social cohesion of the Community of tomorrow. Two camps are forming
along political lines: the Northern "free-marketeers" led by Great Britain
and the Southern Socialists led by France. Northern Member States
have been enthusiastic about the drive towards the completion of the In-
ternal Market and believe that competitive forces should shape the Inter-
nal Market under the guidance of the "invisible hand". The "poorer",
mainly-southern Member States (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland)
argue for a fair allocation of 1992 benefits through greater economic and
social cohesion. As European industry restructures to become more
competitive, the initial job loss estimated at approximately 250,000 per
year will likely be borne most heavily by the southern Member States.
This explains the keen interest by the southern Socialist countries in the
Internal Market program's "social dimension". Moreover, as ideological
67 EUROPE, NO. 4870 (New Series)(Oct. 10/11, 1988).
68 Britain Leads Opposition, supra note 64, at 4, col. 1.
69 Id. The chairman of the Commission is Mr. Jacques Delors, former French Finance Minister.
70 EUROPE, NO. 4903, supra note 65, at 11.
71 Id.
72 Britain Leads Opposition, supra note 64, at 4, col. 1; A European Company Plan, supra note 64,
at 6.
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ringmaster, Socialist France believes that the Community has been too
"soft" on the rich and should provide higher levels of social protection to
the poor. The rift is steadily widening between the "free-marketeers"
and the "interventionists" on social, monetary and tax fronts. Such ideo-
logical dispute may prove to be a key factor should the European Com-
pany Statute once again be shelved.
